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497 
COMMENT 
How to Raise Money: State Question 640, Revenue Bills, 
and the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
I. Introduction 
A series of Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions in 2017 have 
significantly altered the treatment of tax legislation in Oklahoma. These 
cases involved challenges to various legislative enactments designed to 
close the budget shortfall in the last few days of the 2017 Regular Session. 
The resulting decisions clarified the definition of “revenue bill” under the 
Oklahoma Constitution and will provide up-to-date guidelines for the 
legislature when drafting future revenue-raising measures.  
Keeping the revenue bill restrictions of State Question 640 and these 
recent Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions in mind, this Comment seeks to 
explain what the Oklahoma legislature should consider when authoring 
legislation that affects revenue. In Part II, this Comment provides a brief 
background of the events leading up to the 2017 Oklahoma Supreme Court 
cases. Part III discusses the most important cases regarding revenue bills in 
Oklahoma’s Supreme Court history and how they have affected legislative 
drafting before and after State Question 640. Part IV analyzes the 2017 
Oklahoma Supreme Court rulings that will, going forward, serve as guides 
for drafting revenue-raising legislation. Part V discusses how these cases 
serve as guides and what their respective rulings mean for the future of 
Oklahoma revenue bills. Finally, Part VI concludes these issues. 
II. Background 
Since its enactment in 1907, article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution
1
 has prohibited revenue-raising bills “from originating in the 
Senate and prohibited their enactment within the last five days of the 
legislative session.”2 While application of article V, section 33 has been 
consistent throughout Oklahoma’s history, an increasingly narrow 
definition of “revenue bill” emerged, accompanied by a number of potential 
exceptions.
3
 In the past century, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                                 
 1. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 33. 
 2. Mark H. Ramsey, What Is a Revenue Bill Within the Meaning of Our Most Recent 
Constitutional Amendment, 63 OKLA. B.J. 1567, 1568 (1992). 
 3. Id. 
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considered several of these exceptions.
4
 Some exceptions have been altered 
or added by a 1992 vote by the people that made raising revenue in 
Oklahoma extremely onerous: State Question 640.
5
 
Twenty-five years ago, the people of Oklahoma voted to amend the 
Oklahoma Constitution via State Question 640, which further restricted the 
ability of the state legislature to pass revenue-raising measures.
6
 State 
Question 640, proudly supported by the mantra “No New Taxes Without A 
Vote Of The People,” was designed to greatly increase the constitutional 
requirements for the Oklahoma legislature to pass revenue bills.
7
 State 
Question 640 accomplished this goal by amending the minimum vote 
requirement under article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma Constitution to 
require a simple majority of the people or a three-fourths supermajority in 
both Houses to pass revenue bills.
8
 Only Oklahoma, Michigan, and 
Arkansas require such a stringent supermajority to pass revenue bills.
9
 Over 
the years, Oklahoma has felt the effects of this significant revenue-raising 
barrier, and many very important state functions have suffered.
10
 On the 
other hand, revenue reductions, such as tax cuts, face little trouble making it 
through the legislature, leading to even lower budgets for state functions 
such as public schools, mental health clinics, and veteran affairs.
11
 In short, 
it is relatively easy to pass bills that decrease revenue, but extremely 
difficult to pass legislation that increases it. All these budget issues finally 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See, e.g., Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 85, 406 P.3d 
571; Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State, 2017 OK 64, 401 P.3d 1152; Naifeh v. State ex rel. 
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, 400 P.3d 759. 
 5. State Question No. 640, Initiative Petition No. 348 (as proposed by Okla. Sec'y of 
State, Oct. 30, 1991), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/questions/640.pdf. 
 6. Id.; see also Fent v. Fallin, 2014 OK 105, ¶ 10, 345 P.3d 1113, 1116.  
 7. Fent, 2014 OK 105, ¶ 13, 345 P.3d at 1117. 
 8. State Question No. 640, Initiative Petition No. 348, supra note 5; OKLA. CONST. art. 
V, § 33 (C)-(D). 
 9. ARK. BUREAU OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, REP. NO. 05-101, A SUMMARY OF 
LEGISLATIVE SUPERMAJORITY REQUIREMENTS 2 (2005) (noting that, although both Michigan 
and Arkansas have the same requirement as Oklahoma, the Michigan constitutional 
restriction only applies to state property taxes); see also Naifeh v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax 
Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, ¶ 13 nn.18-21, 400 P.3d 759, 764 nn.18-21.  
 10. See Gene Perry, However You Count It, Oklahoma’s Per Pupil Education Funding 
Is Way Down, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (Oct. 20, 2016), https://okpolicy.org/however-count-
oklahomas-per-pupil-education-funding-way/. 
 11. Id. (“[T]he total cost of Oklahoma’s cuts to the top income tax rate since 2004 has 
reached $1.022 billion per year.”); see also David Blatt, Proposed Budget Leaves Oklahoma 
Services Massively Underfunded, OKLA. POL’Y INST. (May 25, 2017), https://okpolicy.org/ 
proposed-budget-leaves-oklahoma-services-massively-underfunded/. 
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came to a head with the 2017 Regular Session for the Oklahoma legislature, 
during which “months of wrangling and stalled negotiations” led to delays 
for several bills designed to increase revenue for the state budget.
12
  
The Oklahoma legislature began its 2017 Regular Session with the 
constitutional requirement to balance
13
 an approximately $800 million 
budget deficit.
14
 This deficit equates to a staggering inflation-adjusted $1.25 
billion drop in the state budget compared to 2009.
15
 In an attempt to avoid 
“draconian cuts to [Oklahoma’s] core services,” the House and Senate 
proposed a number of last-minute bills designed to generate revenue to fill 
the budget hole.
16
 The state legislature, aware of the requirements imposed 
by State Question 640, appears to have simply hoped for the best in 
enacting many of these last-minute bills that did not reach supermajority 
support.
17
 This may have been due to a lack of clarity in what renders a bill 
a revenue bill under State Question 640 and Oklahoma Supreme Court 
precedent, but it could also have been due to panic in the Oklahoma 
legislature. 
No matter the underlying cause of the state of emergency that 
necessitated the 2017 Special Session, recent Oklahoma Supreme Court 
decisions have created a roadmap for the Oklahoma legislature to follow 
when enacting revenue-raising legislation.
18
 Some of the revenue-raising 
legislation was challenged and addressed by the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Blatt, supra note 11. 
 13. See OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 23. 
 14. Blatt, supra note 11. Governor Mary Fallin and the Oklahoma legislature had a 
severe budget crisis on their hands that was directly affecting education, health care, and 
several other important industries. See Associated Press, Oklahoma Faces $878 Million 
Shortfall for Upcoming Year, Revenue Failure Declared, KFOR (Feb. 21, 2017, 11:11 AM), 
https://kfor.com/2017/02/21/oklahoma-faces-878-million-shortfall-for-upcoming-year-
revenue-failure-declared/. 
 15. Blatt, supra note 11. 
 16. Governor Mary Fallin, Press Release: Gov. Fallin Statement on 2018 Fiscal Year 
Budget Agreement, OK.GOV (May 24, 2017), http://services.ok.gov/triton/modules/ 
newsroom/newsroom_article.php?id=223&article_id=32877; see also Blatt, supra note 11. 
Oklahoma’s revenues have been on a steep decline for years, and 2018 (and beyond, if the 
trend continues) will be no exception, despite all the bills that either have not been 
challenged or have already been upheld by the Supreme Court. See Blatt, supra note 11. 
While the projected revenue for 2018 was slightly higher than 2017, agencies will still get 
budget cuts, just as they have for the five preceding years. Id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See, e.g., Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 85, 406 P.3d 
571; Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State, 2017 OK 64, 401 P.3d 1152; Naifeh v. State ex rel. 
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, 400 P.3d 759. 
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in 2017, starting with Naifeh v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 
which involved a challenge to Senate Bill 845.
19
 Senate Bill 845, known as 
the “Smoking Cessation and Prevention Act of 2017,” created a smoking 
cessation fee of $1.50 per pack of cigarettes.
20
 Despite language in the text 
of the bill suggesting that its primary purpose was to benefit the public 
health,
21
 the Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down Senate Bill 845 under 
article V, section 33 as an improperly enacted revenue bill.
22
 The loss of 
this bill single-handedly caused “$215 million in appropriated funds for 
fiscal year 2018” to evaporate, exacerbating the revenue shortfall.23  
After Naifeh, the Oklahoma Supreme Court decided Oklahoma 
Automobile Dealers Ass’n v. State, a case involving the constitutionality of 
House Bill 2433.
24
 In upholding House Bill 2433, which partially removed 
a sales tax exemption that was given to automobile sales in 1935,
25
 the 
court ruled that although the bill did not satisfy the requirements of article 
V, section 33, House Bill 2433 did not constitute a revenue bill within the 
meaning of the Constitution.
26
 Thus, the court did not strike down the bill as 
unconstitutional.
27
 This legislation is expected to generate $123 million in 
2018.
28
  
The third case, Sierra Club v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 
brought a challenge to House Bill 1449.
29
 Congress drafted House Bill 1449 
to modify the “Motor Fuels Tax” to set new registration fees for hybrid and 
fully electric vehicles.
30
 According to the author of House Bill 1449, the bill 
was intended “to replace lost motor fuel tax revenue that's used for road and 
bridge repairs” such that electric and hybrid car owners pay their fair share 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Naifeh, ¶ 7, 400 P.3d at 762-63.  
 20. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
 21. See infra Section IV.A (explaining that merely drafting a regulatory purpose for 
revenue-raising legislation is not enough: the legislation must effectuate that purpose 
through the use of the raised funds). 
 22. Naifeh, ¶ 51, 400 P.3d at 775. 
 23. OKLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 56TH SESS., 2017 SESSION IN REVIEW 43 (2017), 
https://www.okhouse.gov/Documents/SIR%202017%20web.pdf [hereinafter OKLA. HOUSE, 
2017 SESSION IN REVIEW]. 
 24. Okla. Auto. Dealers, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 2, 401 P.3d at 1153HB. 
 25. Id. ¶ 2, 401 P.3d at 1153-54 (citing H.R. 2433, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. OKLA. HOUSE, 2017 SESSION IN REVIEW, supra note 23. 
 29. 2017 OK 83, ¶ 1, 405 P.3d 691, 694. 
 30. H.R. 1449, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
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for general road upkeep.
31
 The court held that the bill was a revenue bill and 
struck the law down as unconstitutional.
32
 
Finally, Richardson v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission was a 
challenge to several bills.
33
 While House Bills 2433 and 1449 were already 
decided in the previous cases, the petitioner challenged House Bill 2348 for 
the first time.
34
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied their jurisdiction over 
the case and so did not reach the issue of House Bill 2348 because, at the 
time of the decision, it was not possible to know “whether the law would 
increase revenue.”35 
III. The History of Oklahoma Revenue Legislation in the Supreme Court 
For well over a century, article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution has produced significant litigation over its interpretation. As 
discussed below, the Oklahoma Supreme Court created a two-pronged test 
to determine whether legislation is revenue legislation within the meaning 
of article V, section 33. This test has changed considerably over time. 
A. Article V, Section 33 and the Anderson Test 
The original two requirements for a revenue bill to become a law are still 
in place today. First, a revenue bill must “originate in the House,” rather 
than the Senate.
36
 Second, the bill must not “be passed during the last five 
days of the [legislative] session.”37 Article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution did not originally contain the supermajority clause it does now. 
The first case to establish guidelines for revenue bills in Oklahoma was 
Anderson v. Ritterbusch, decided just one year after the formation of 
Oklahoma as a state.
38
 Anderson, the petitioner in the case, appealed the 
assessment of taxes on his property stemming from a newly enacted senate 
bill.
39
 Of his many arguments, the most pertinent to this Comment was his 
challenge under article V, section 33 that the bill in question was an 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Dale Denwalt, Proposed Oklahoma Fees on Hybrid, Electric Cars Would Generate 
$1M Annually, OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 30, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://newsok.com/article/5543560. 
 32. Sierra Club, ¶ 26, 405 P.3d at 700.  
 33. 2017 OK 85, 406 P.3d 571. 
 34. See id. ¶ 1, 406 P.3d at 572. 
 35. Id. ¶ 5, 406 P.3d at 573. 
 36. OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 33. 
 37. Id. 
 38. 1908 OK 250, 98 P. 1002. 
 39. See id. ¶¶ 1-2, 98 P. at 1004. 
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unconstitutionally enacted revenue bill.
40
 Justice Kane, writing for a 
unanimous Supreme Court, primarily discussed the history of the 
origination clause in the U.S. Constitution and concluded that the bill in 
question was not a revenue-raising bill within the meaning of the Oklahoma 
Constitution.
41
 The origination clause was created by the British House of 
Commons and adopted by the U.S. Constitution, and it mandates that 
revenue legislation must start in the House of Representatives.
42
 Thereafter, 
a majority of states adopted the same clause in their own constitutions,
43
 
Oklahoma included. Justice Kane reasoned that, to properly rule on this 
issue of first impression in Oklahoma, he needed to understand why the 
clause was drafted in the first place. Borrowing language from Justice 
Harlan of the United States Supreme Court, Justice Kane established the 
two-pronged test that has been used throughout Oklahoma’s history. The 
first prong defines revenue bills as “those that levy taxes in the strict sense 
of the word,” and the second prong states that “the principal object is the 
raising of revenue” and not “bills for other purposes which may incidentally 
create revenue.”44 Justice Kane held that the bill in question did not satisfy 
the second prong of this test because the primary purpose of the bill was to 
prevent property owners from circumventing taxes, not to raise revenue.
45
 
Since Anderson, this test has been used consistently in cases dealing with 
revenue bills, including cases decided after the passing of State Question 
640, albeit with some alterations.
46
 Moreover, the Anderson opinion 
contained dicta stating that bills which “lower the rate of taxation of the 
state” are also considered revenue bills within the meaning of the 
Oklahoma Constitution.
47
 This assertion was eventually resolved by State 
Question 640 in Fent v. Fallin discussed below.
48
  
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. ¶ 2, 98 P. at 1004. 
 41. Id. ¶¶ 15-18, 98 P. at 1007. 
 42. Id. ¶ 6, 98 P. at 1005 (quoting 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 871, at 338 (1833)); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, 
cl. 1. 
 43. Anderson, ¶ 8, 98 P. at 1006 (quoting STORY, supra note 42, § 875, at 342). 
 44. Id. ¶ 16, 98 P. at 1007 (quoting Twin City Nat’l Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 
(1897)). 
 45. Id. ¶ 15, 98 P. at 1007. 
 46. Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 8 n.21, 401 P.3d 1152, 1155 
n.21; see also Naifeh v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, ¶¶ 17-20, 400 P.3d 
759, 765-66. 
 47. Anderson, ¶ 14, 98 P. at 1006 (dictum). 
 48. 2014 OK 105, ¶¶ 7, 17–18, 345 P.3d 1113, 1115–16, 1118 (overruling dicta in 
the Anderson opinion that suggested the definition of “raising revenue” might include bills 
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B. Levying a Tax in the Strict Sense of the Word 
The first Oklahoma Supreme Court case after the establishment of the 
Anderson two-pronged test, which also dealt with the constitutional 
treatment of the removal of a tax exemption, was Cornelius v. State ex rel. 
Cruce.
49
 Cornelius, the “register of deeds of Oklahoma,” brought this suit 
and demanded the state pay a newly-enacted tax owed for recording a 
mortgage.
50
 This tax was created to remove an exemption in place for 
mortgages by “deem[ing] [them] to be real property, and . . . assess[ing] 
and tax[ing]” them as such under the challenged act.51 The Oklahoma 
Supreme Court, in another unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas, 
did not strike down the act under article V, section 33 and held that a bill 
“merely declar[ing] that certain property theretofore exempt from taxation 
shall thereafter be subject to taxation” is not a revenue measure within the 
meaning of the Constitution because it does not levy a tax in the strict sense 
of the word
52
 and, therefore, fails the first prong of the test.
53
 Just as the 
court in Anderson studied the history of revenue bills to reach its decision, 
Justice Turner looked to decisions in other states to come to his 
conclusion.
54
  
Just one year later, Justice Hardy revisited the treatment of tax 
exemptions under article V, section 33 and reaffirmed Cornelius for the 
same reasons.
55
 This holding has been questioned  throughout Oklahoma’s 
history, including after State Question 640, but the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court has not wavered.
56
 Thereafter, the next challenge to legislation which 
removed a tax exemption came to the Oklahoma Supreme Court nearly half 
a century later.
57
 In 1956, the court upheld Cornelius in Leveridge v. 
Oklahoma Tax Commission by ruling that a bill removing an exemption 
from a registration fee for used cars failed the first prong of the test because 
                                                                                                                 
resulting in a decrease of revenue (citing Perry Cty. v. Selma Ry. Co., 58 Ala. 546 (Ala. 
1877)). 
 49. 1914 OK 222, 140 P. 1187. 
 50. Id. ¶ 1, 140 P. at 1188. 
 51. Id. ¶ 9, 140 P. at 1188. 
 52. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11, 140 P. at 1188 (quoting Mumford v. Sewall, 4 P. 585 (Or. 1883)). 
 53. Id. ¶ 11, 140 P. at 1188. 
 54. See, e.g., id. 
 55. See Trs.’, Ex’rs’ & Sec. Ins. Corp. v. Hooton, 1915 OK 1059, ¶¶ 25-26, 158 P. 293, 
298. 
 56. See, e.g., Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 26, 401 P.3d 1152, 
1162. 
 57. See Leveridge v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1956 OK 77, 294 P.2d 809. 
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“[t]he bill under consideration d[id] not within its four corners levy a tax.”58 
Leveridge, the most recent case to examine bills that remove a tax 
exemption under article V, section 33 before the 2017 cases, received heavy 
scrutiny in Oklahoma Automobile Dealers Ass’n v. State, discussed below, 
with four justices arguing that it should be overruled in light of State 
Question 640.
59
  
C. The Principal Object of Raising Revenue 
The second prong in the Anderson test has gone through even more 
significant changes in interpretation than the first prong. The first decision, 
based primarily on the second prong, occurred in In re Lee, in which the 
plaintiff challenged a law establishing the $25 docket fee then charged “in 
each case filed in the Supreme Court.”60 One basis of the challenge to the 
enacted law was that it was a revenue bill that originated in the Senate and 
was therefore unconstitutional under article V, section 33.
61
 Relying on 
Cornelius and the test laid out in Anderson, the court upheld the law 
because “it prescribes a fee to the public for services rendered by their 
officers, and is not exacted for revenue, but as compensation.”62 
Effectively, this law failed the second prong of the revenue bill test because 
it generated revenue “incidentally.”63  
The following year, the Supreme Court upheld another law for the same 
reason in Lusk v. Ryan.
64
 The law in question in Lusk provided first that a 
revenue officer must hold alleged illegal and excessive taxes for thirty days 
after the taxpayer gives the officer notice that the taxpayer believes that the 
taxes are illegal. Second, the law provided that the revenue officer must pay 
back any amount deemed by a court to be excessive and illegal.
65
 The 
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the enacted law was not a revenue bill 
because it “simply provide[d] a procedure to recover illegal taxes paid.”66 
This was not “a bill for the raising of revenue” within the meaning of article 
V, section 33 because the bill was not intended to raise any revenue.
67
 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 294 P. at 811-12 (citing Cornelius, 1914 OK 222, 140 P. 1187). 
 59. See Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶ 7-11, 401 P.3d at 1168 (Watt, J., dissenting). 
 60. In re Lee, 1917 OK 458, ¶ 1, 168 P. 53, 54, superseded by statute on other grounds, 
20 OKLA. STAT. § 15 (2011). 
 61. Id. ¶ 32, 168 P. at 57. 
 62. Id.  
 63. See id. 
 64. 1918 OK 94, ¶ 3, 171 P. 323, 324. 
 65. Id. ¶ 2, 171 P. at 324. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
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Although the bill specifically targeted taxes, it did not attempt to raise or 
change them. It simply gave taxpayers a method to recover taxes collected 
when a court ruled the taxes illegal. 
The principal object prong was used, yet again, to uphold a law called 
the Motor Vehicle Act, which provided a “license fee to be paid by 
operators” of commercial motor vehicles using the Oklahoma state 
highways for profit.
68
 In two similar cases challenging the enacted law, Ex 
parte Sales and Ex parte Tindall, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that 
the Motor Vehicle Act was not a revenue bill because the law “regulat[ed] a 
growing effort, on the part of certain enterprises, to appropriate the public 
highways to their own free use” and did not set out to raise revenue.69 Just 
as in Lusk, the principal purpose of the enacted law was not to raise 
revenue. The tax revenue was merely incidental to the true purpose of 
maintaining the public highways. 
In Tindall, the first of the two challenges, Petitioner A.L. Tindall was 
arrested for not complying with the then-enacted Motor Vehicle Act.
70
 
Tindall challenged the enacted law under numerous provisions of the 
Oklahoma Constitution, including article V, section 33.
71
 The following 
case, Ex parte Sales, had facts, allegations, and defenses identical to 
Tindall,
72
 but the court investigated article V, section 33 in more detail. The 
Sales court noted that the Motor Vehicle Act, by requiring for-profit users 
of the public highways to pay a fee, provided a method of supporting the 
regulation and maintenance of the highways.
73
 Any revenue raised was 
“merely incidental” to that purpose.74 Therefore, the court held that the 
enacted law was not a revenue bill.
75
 
As the court elaborated in more recent cases, the money raised went 
directly to support the true purpose of the bill: supporting public 
transportation on highways. In Pure Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 
the court dealt with a similar set of circumstances and upheld another law 
requiring a license fee for certain vehicle operators, following Sales and 
Tindall.
76
   
                                                                                                                 
 68. Ex parte Sales, 1924 OK 668, ¶ 7, 233 P. 186, 187; see also Ex parte Tindall, 1924 
OK 669, ¶ 4, 229 P. 125, 127. 
 69. Sales, ¶ 7, 233 P. at 187. 
 70. Tindall, ¶¶ 1-2, 229 P. at 127. 
 71. See id. ¶ 5, 229 P. at 127. 
 72. Sales, ¶ 2, 233 P. at 187. 
 73. Id. ¶ 7, 233 P. at 187. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 1936 OK 516, ¶ 10, 66 P.2d 1097, 1100 (citing Tindall, 1924 OK 669, 229 P. 125). 
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D. State Question 640 and Fent v. Fallin 
Throughout the many challenges to revenue legislation, the two-pronged 
test has been reaffirmed time and time again.
77
 At the time of this 
Comment, Oklahoma’s definition of “revenue bill” is well established. 
However, in 1992, when the people of Oklahoma voted on State Question 
640, there was a degree of uncertainty as to what constituted a revenue 
bill.
78
 State Question 640, passed by a 56.2% majority of the people,
79
 
added two provisions to article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma 
Constitution.
80
 The first provision imposes a democratic vote requirement 
for most revenue bills: 
C. Any revenue bill originating in the House of Representatives 
shall not become effective until it has been referred to the people 
of the state at the next general election held throughout the state 
and shall become effective and be in force when it has been 
approved by a majority of the votes cast on the measure at such 
election and not otherwise, except as otherwise provided in 
subsection D of this section.
81
 
The second provision created an alternative way to enact revenue bills by 
allowing a 75% supermajority of both the House and Senate.
82
 In effect, 
State Question 640 requires a majority of the people or a 75% 
supermajority of both houses of the legislature to enact revenue bills.  
At the time of passage of State Question 640, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court had only ruled on article V, section 33 challenges to  legislation that 
increased taxes, but not  legislation that decreased them.
83
 The court faced 
such a challenge in Fent v. Fallin in 2014.
84
 The bill at issue in Fent 
contained provisions that would “reduce[] income taxes in some 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See , e.g., Calvey v. Daxon, 2000 OK 17, ¶ 18, 997 P.2d 164, 171; Fent v. Okla. 
Capitol Improvement Auth., 1999 OK 64, ¶ 12, 984 P.2d 200, 209; In re Initiative Petition 
No. 348, State Question No. 640, 1991 OK 110, ¶ 3 n.3, 820 P.2d 772, 774 n.3 (citing Pure 
Oil Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1936 OK 516, 66 P.2d 1097); Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs v. Okla. 
Pub. Emp. Ret. Sys., 1965 OK 111, ¶ 23, 405 P.2d 68, 73; Wallace v. Gassaway, 1931 OK 
210, ¶¶ 18-19, 298 P. 867, 870. 
 78. State Question No. 640, Initiative Petition No. 348, supra note 5. 
 79. State Question 640, What’s That?, OKLA. POL’Y INST., https://okpolicy.org/state-
question-640/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2018). 
 80. State Question No. 640, Initiative Petition No. 348, supra note 5. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Fent v. Fallin, 2014 OK 105, ¶ 7, 345 P.3d 1113, 1116. 
 84. Id. ¶ 17, 345 P.3d at 1117-18. 
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circumstances” by modifying Oklahoma income tax rates.85 The attorney 
Jerry Fent challenged that bill under article V, section 33 alleging that the 
bill was an unconstitutionally enacted “revenue bill” under the Oklahoma 
Constitution.
86
 At first glance, this case appeared to be an easy decision in 
favor of the petitioner. The bill in question lowered income tax rates, and 
such a bill was a “revenue bill” under the Anderson line of cases. Therefore, 
Petitioner Fent argued that “whether legislation increases or decreases taxes 
is irrelevant if the purpose of the legislation is to collect taxes.”87 While that 
seemed to be the rule under Anderson, the Oklahoma Supreme Court took a 
different view after the people amended article V, section 33 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution. Writing for the majority, Justice Kauger held 
instead that “the voters did not intend § 33 to apply to bills which decrease 
state revenues” when they enacted State Question 640.88 Justice Kauger 
focused very closely on what “the ordinary person who voted on the 1992 
amendment” believed they were supporting.89 Referring to the news and 
press at the time of the vote, she concluded that the people approved State 
Question 640 because they wanted to “limit[] the Legislature's taxing 
power” and “restrict[] tax hikes to bring accountability” to Oklahoma’s 
government.
90
 While the Anderson court relied on state court and United 
Kingdom precedent, Justice Kauger focused on “[t]he intent of the framers 
and electorate in adopting” State Question 640.91 Justice Kauger concluded 
that there was no suggestion that the amendment should apply to any laws 
other than those which seek to raise revenue or “increase the tax burden.”92  
Ultimately, it was clear to the Oklahoma Supreme Court that the 
amendment changed the meaning of “revenue bill” within the Oklahoma 
Constitution.
93
 Thus, in Fent, the Supreme Court officially resolved the 
issue presented by the Anderson dicta
94
 regarding State Question 640: the 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 345 P.3d at 1114-15. 
 86. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 345 P.3d at 1115. 
 87. Id. ¶¶ 4, 7, 345 P.3d at 1115-16. This “secondary” holding in Anderson was, in fact, 
dicta; however, it was still an important part of the opinion, and Fent provided the 
opportunity to challenge it. See Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax 
Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 8 n.21, 401 P.3d 1152, 1155 n.21 (noting that Fent overruled 
Anderson dicta). 
 88. Fent, ¶ 10, 345 P.3d at 1116. 
 89. Id. ¶ 13, 345 P.3d at 1117. 
 90. Id. ¶ 10, 345 P.3d at 1116. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. ¶ 17, 345 P.3d at 1117-18. 
 93. Id. ¶ 13, 345 P.3d at 1117. 
 94. Id. ¶ 18, 345 P.3d at 1118. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
508 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:497 
 
 
term “revenue bill” no longer includes bills that would decrease revenue 
because such legislation does not have the principal purpose of raising 
revenue.
95
 
IV. The 2017 Supreme Court Rulings 
Three years after Fent, the Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled on several 
challenges brought against various newly enacted House and Senate bills.
96
 
These cases, paired with Fent, form the general guidelines for the 
Oklahoma legislature to follow when authoring revenue bills. With the 
decisions laid down in these three cases, the justices explained how they 
will treat different revenue-raising measures under State Question 640. The 
first 2017 revenue bill case was Naifeh v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax 
Commission, challenging a new “fee” imposed on cigarette wholesalers. 
The second was Oklahoma Automobile Dealers Ass’n v. State, challenging 
a partial revocation of a tax exemption on the sale of vehicles. The third 
was Sierra Club v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, challenging a 
new “fee” placed on the purchase of hybrid and fully-electric vehicles. The 
final case was Richardson v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 
challenging not only the tax exemption removal and fee for hybrid and 
electric vehicles, but also the changes in the standard Oklahoma income tax 
deduction. 
A. Naifeh v. State 
Naifeh involved a challenge to the newly enacted
97
 Senate Bill 845, the 
“Smoking Cessation and Prevention Act of 2017,” which assessed a new 
$1.50-per-pack fee on cigarette wholesalers.
98
 Justice Wyrick, writing for a 
unanimous court, ruled that the legislation was a revenue bill within the 
meaning of article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma Constitution because it 
was a tax in the strict sense of the word and had the principal purpose of 
increasing revenue, thereby satisfying both prongs of the Anderson test.
99
  
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. ¶ 13, 345 P.3d at 1117. 
 96. See Naifeh v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, 400 P.3d 759; Okla. 
Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, 401 P.3d 1152; 
Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 85, 406 P.3d 571. 
 97. The legislators recognized that it was “a decision between bad or worse”: either they 
do not balance the budget, or they enact legislation subject to a potentially successful 
challenge under article V, section 33. Naifeh, ¶ 9, 400 P.3d at 763 (citing OKLA. CONST. art. 
X, §§ 23, 25).  
 98. Id. ¶ 2, 400 P.3d at 761 (citing S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017)). 
 99. Id. ¶ 3, 400 P.3d at 761. 
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After a backdrop of the history of revenue bills in Oklahoma, the court 
began its discussion with the second prong of the Anderson test and 
considered whether the legislation had the principal purpose of raising 
revenue.
100
 One of the first and most pressing considerations was that the 
amount of revenue resulting from the fee that would actually serve the 
claimed purpose of the bill was insignificant compared to the expected 
overall revenue from the legislation.
101
 As the title suggests, Senate Bill 845 
purported to raise money to cease and prevent smoking throughout 
Oklahoma.
102
 While the government argued that this bill is “regulatory in 
nature,” the court disagreed: “only a tiny fraction (about 0.5%) of the 
revenues are to be apportioned to a fund used for smoking-cessation 
efforts” while the vast majority of the funds would be used for general state 
healthcare purposes.
103
 As previously discussed, the budget for Oklahoma 
was in dire straits, and Senate Bill 845 was expected to raise a significant 
amount of money for the statemore than $250 million.104 The principal 
issue facing the court was that the money raised from this bill did not really 
have a specific purpose outside of the “tiny fraction” being used for the 
legislation’s smoking cessation façade, which was only one million of the 
expected $250 million.
105
 Senate Bill 845 represented the “single largest 
source of new revenue for the State” and was crucial to offset Oklahoma’s 
budget crisis.
106
 However, the revenue was not raised for a purpose 
permissible for the bill to avoid the constitutional restrictions of article V, 
section 33.
107
  
In the text of the bill, the drafters attempted to show that the main 
purpose was smoking prevention, but the bill did not actually require that 
an amount be spent to that end.
108
 Instead, it appropriated everything except 
$1 million to a “Heath Care Enhancement Fund” which was meant to 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. ¶ 21, 400 P.3d at 766. 
 101. Id. ¶ 24, 400 P.3d at 767. 
 102. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
 103. Naifeh, ¶ 24, 400 P.3d at 767. 
 104. S. 845 (Comm. Substitute), 56th Leg., 1st Sess., at 5 (Okla. 2017); The Oklahoman 
Editorial Board, Legal Challenge to Oklahoma Tobacco “Fee” Is No Surprise, NEWSOK 
(June 12, 2017 12:00AM), https://newsok.com/article/5552303/legal-challenge-to-
oklahoma-tobacco-fee-is-no-surprise (citing an official estimate of $257 million).  
 105. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. 4 (Okla. 2017). 
 106. Naifeh, ¶ 33, 400 P.3d at 770. 
 107. Naifeh, ¶ 36-37, 400 P.3d at 770. 
 108. There are no specific mandated expenditures to be found anywhere in the text of the 
bill. There are only certain required acts which generally discourage smoking in certain 
places. See S. 845, 56th Leg. 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
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generally “enhanc[e] the health of Oklahomans.”109 Justice Wyrick’s 
concern, at least in terms of article V, section 33, was that the bill “[did] not 
provide more specific direction nor [did] it send any money” to any specific 
government agency for the purpose of preventing smoking in Oklahoma.
110
 
Although the bill stated that “[t]he State Department of Health and the 
Tobacco Settlement Endowment Trust shall work together” and “[t]he 
Oklahoma State Department of Health and the Department of Mental 
Health and Substance Abuse Services shall work together” to attack 
smoking-related issues in Oklahoma, it did not identify how, when, or with 
what money these agencies would perform their respective duties.
111
 
Furthermore, Justice Wyrick held that the other “regulatory” provisions 
written in the bill are nothing more than codifications of previously enacted 
policies or are otherwise vague and ambiguous with little or no direction 
given to the agencies tasked with implementing them.
112
  
The court continued the principal purpose analysis with some 
comparisons to relevant Oklahoma Supreme Court precedent.
113
 First, 
Justice Wyrick dismissed the government’s contention that the revenue 
from the $1.50-per-pack fee was incidental to the purpose of preventing 
smoking in Oklahoma.
114
 While he agreed that in other circumstances it 
could be the case, such as if the fee imposed by the law was instead a 
penalty for a smoking-related violation, Justice Wyrick did not believe that 
“a quarter-of-a-billion dollars per year” can really be said to be 
“incidental.”115 The court agreed that this sort of fee was, for all intents and 
purposes, a “sin tax” subject to the constraints of article V, section 33 
because its main purpose is to raise revenue.
116
 Differentiating this “fee” 
from the fee challenged in In re Lee, Justice Wyrick noted that in Lee “there 
was a direct nexus between the fee and the government service being 
provided to the payor of the fee,” e.g. the $25 filing fee for the Supreme 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Id. at 4. 
 110. Naifeh, ¶ 26, 400 P.3d at 767. 
 111. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. 3 (Okla. 2017). The bill provides specific issues that 
these duos are supposed to research but does not give them any money with which to work. 
Id.  
 112. Naifeh, ¶¶ 25-31, 400 P.3d at 767-68. 
 113. Id. ¶ 39, 400 P.3d at 771. 
 114. Id. ¶ 38, 400 P.3d at 770-71. 
 115. Id. ¶ 35, 400 P.3d at 769-70 (“If the Legislature had chosen to reduce smoking by 
making it illegal . . . with civil penalties . . . the revenue generated . . . might well be 
incidental . . . .”). 
 116. Id. ¶ 36, 400 P.3d at 770. 
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Court;
117
 whereas Justice Wyrick pointed out a very obvious difference 
between the Lee filing fee and the cigarette “fee” in Naifeh: “the 1.50 
assessment [was] actually assessed against the seller of cigarettes, whom no 
one argues will make use of any government-provided health services.”118 
According to the court, the past cases in which various fees were ruled to be 
incidental to the purpose of the bills that created them were different from 
the Naifeh smoking cessation fee because this fee “is ultimately aimed at 
consumers rather than upon a [taxpayer] profiting from the use of state 
services,” especially considering the vague and non-specific directives 
drafted for the fee revenue.
119
 Thus, Justice Wyrick concluded that Senate 
Bill 845 had passed the principal purpose prong of the Anderson test.
120
 
Additionally, the court reaffirmed the holding in Fent v. Fallin by 
“reiterat[ing] that whether a measure is ‘intended to raise revenue’ must be 
the overarching consideration in determining whether a measure is a 
‘revenue bill.’”121  
The court next considered the first prong of the Anderson test—whether 
the Smoking Cessation and Prevention Act “levie[d] a tax in the strict 
sense” of the word.122 The ultimate question in Naifeh was whether the 
“smoking cessation fee” was, in fact, “a fee or a tax.”123 While Justice 
Wyrick agreed that the text of Senate Bill 845 itself suggested that the 
$1.50 per pack was a fee because it was “assessed primarily” for regulatory 
purposes, he noted that the nature of the cessation fee did not effectuate the 
purpose as it was written in the legislation.
124
 There have been many 
different cigarette fees that have been enacted in Oklahoma and all of them 
have been “codified as excise taxes.”125 This $1.50-per-pack fee would have 
been treated no differently than these other excise taxes.
126
 The revenue 
from the fee would have been collected by the Oklahoma Tax Commission 
and deposited in the State Treasury for use by the government for general 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Id. ¶ 39, 400 P.3d at 771. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. ¶ 41, 400 P.3d at 772. 
 120. See id. ¶ 42, 400 P.3d at 772. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. ¶ 43, 400 P.3d at 772. 
 123. Id. ¶ 43, 400 P.3d at 773. 
 124. Id. ¶ 43, 400 P.3d at 772-73 (quoting GenOn Mid-Atl., LLC v. Montgomery Cty., 
650 F.3d 1021, 1023 (4th Cir. 2011)). 
 125. Id. ¶¶ 43-44, 400 P.3d at 772-73 (citing several different Oklahoma bills and statutes 
that tax cigarettes in different ways). 
 126. Id. ¶ 44, 400 P.3d at 773 & n.72. 
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healthcare enhancements.
127
 None of those general healthcare 
enhancements are directly related to smoking, the only exception being the 
$1 million used for the express purposes of the bill.
128
 Justice Wyrick went 
even further and pointed out that the “consumer who ultimately bears the 
costs of the assessment is paying the retailer consideration in exchange for a 
pack of cigarettes, rather than the government in exchange for healthcare 
for his smoking-related illness.”129 His worry, if the court upheld Senate 
Bill 845, was that a “quintessential excise tax [could] be transformed into a 
fee merely by calling it a fee and adding some regulatory gloss” thereby 
increasing the tax burden without a vote of the people or the supermajority 
required by State Question 640.
130
 This would go directly against the “tax 
relief” purpose of State Question 640 to require “all ‘future bills “intended 
to raise revenue”’” to have a supermajority of the Legislature or a majority 
of the people supporting it.
131
 The smoking cessation fee in question levied 
a tax because it would increase the tax burden without conferring a specific 
benefit to the taxpayer.
132
 Having satisfied both prongs of the Anderson test, 
the court unanimously struck down Senate Bill 845 as an unconstitutionally 
enacted revenue bill because the bill was approved within the final five 
days of the legislative session, thereby violating article V, section 33 of the 
Oklahoma Constitution.
133
 
B. Oklahoma Automobile Dealers Ass’n v. State 
In Oklahoma Automobile Dealers, a trade association of car dealers 
brought an unsuccessful challenge to the newly enacted revenue measure 
House Bill 2433.
134
 House Bill 2433 removed 1.25% of the sales tax 
exemption on automobile sales.
135
 In a fiercely divided court, the justices 
upheld the law 5-4.
136
  
  
                                                                                                                 
 127. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. 4 (Okla. 2017). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Naifeh, ¶ 47, 400 P.3d at 774. 
 130. Id. ¶ 49, 400 P.3d at 774-75. 
 131. Id. (quoting Fent v. Fallin, 2014 OK 105, ¶ 14, 345 P.3d 1113, 1117). 
 132. Id. ¶ 39, 400 P.3d at 771. 
 133. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 400 P.3d at 761. 
 134. Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 0, 401 
P.3d 1152, 1153. 
 135. H.R. 2433, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
 136. Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶¶ 25-26, 401 P.3d at 1162. 
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1. The Majority Opinion 
At the outset of the majority opinion written by Justice Wyrick, the court 
ruled that the bill satisfied the primary purpose prong of the Anderson test: 
it had the principal purpose of raising revenue.
137
 The court compared this 
case to Leveridge, discussed above, because it was based on similar 
circumstances.
138
 Like in Leveridge, the Oklahoma Automobile Dealers 
court rejected the argument that the bills in question had any purpose other 
than raising revenue.
139
 Hence, the court focused heavily on the first prong 
of the Anderson test: whether House Bill 2433 levies a tax in the strict sense 
of the word.
140
  
In fact, the overarching consideration for the court in Oklahoma 
Automobile Dealers was the 1956 holding in Leveridge. The House Bill in 
question in Leveridge sought to amend a statute to remove a sales tax 
exemption for the sale of used cars in Oklahoma.
141
 The Leveridge court 
held that the law was not a revenue bill subject to the strictures of the 
Oklahoma Constitution because it did not levy a tax, but “merely declare[d] 
that certain property (automobiles of the latest manufactured models owned 
by used car dealers) theretofore exempt from taxation . . . shall thereafter be 
subject to taxation.”142 The Leveridge court, by following the holding in 
Cornelius v. State, refused to subject bills that remove tax exemptions to the 
constitutional restrictions of article V, section 33.
143
 And in Oklahoma 
Automobile Dealers, the court opted to follow the Leveridge rule in spite of 
State Question 640,
144
 a decision which the dissenting justices hotly 
contested.
145
  
In an attempt to distinguish Leveridge, the Petitioners in Oklahoma 
Automobile Dealers argued that, unlike the law at issue in Leveridge, House 
Bill 2433 was a revenue bill because “it cause[d] people to have to pay 
more taxes.”146 House Bill 2433, providing revenue in the form of a 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. ¶ 12, 401 P.3d at 1157. 
 138. Id. (citing Leveridge v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1956 OK 77, 294 P.2d 809). 
 139. Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶¶ 11-13, 401 P.3d at 1156-57. 
 140. Id. ¶ 13, 401 P.3d at 1157; see also Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 1908 OK 250, ¶ 15, 98 
P. 1002, 1007. 
 141. Leveridge, ¶ 7, 294 P.2d at 811. 
 142. Id. ¶ 13, 294 P.2d at 812. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See generally Okla. Auto. Dealers, 2017 OK 64, 401 P.3d 1152. 
 145. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 401 P.3d at 1162; id. ¶¶ 1-13, 401 P.3d at 1162-66 (Combs, C.J., 
dissenting); id. ¶¶ 1-24, 401 P.3d at 1166-75 (Watt, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. ¶ 17, 401 P.3d at 1158. 
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removal of sales tax exemptions, increases tax revenue in practice. But the 
majority held that merely because a bill raises revenue does not mean the 
bill “levies” a tax.147 In fact, “because the original levies of the sales tax on 
automobile sales were subject” to the constitutional restrictions, this sales 
tax has already successfully satisfied the purposes behind article V, section 
33.
148
  
The court also dismissed one of the most persuasive arguments in Fent v. 
Fallin: State Question 640 did not affect the definition of “revenue bill” 
such that it would encompass bills that remove exemptions from already-
levied taxes.
149
 The court rejected the notion that State Question 640 
changed the definition of revenue bill so drastically as to remove the 
requirement that a bill levy a tax in the strict sense of the word.
150
  
As a final justification for its holding, the court discussed the 
constitutional policies supporting it.
151
 The majority read article V, section 
33 in conjunction with two other constitutional provisions to conclude that 
they “express an unmistakable constitutional policy disfavoring special 
exemptions from taxation.”152 First, article X, section 5 provides that 
“[t]axes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects.”153 The court 
reasoned that, in order to allow the legislature to make taxes more uniform, 
it would be contrary to the constitution to disallow the legislature from 
removing special exemptions, especially if those exemptions would create 
an unjust disparity.
154
 Second, article V, section 50 limits the legislature’s 
power from enacting tax exemptions for “any property withis [sic] this 
State.”155 The legislature can only enact exemptions that the constitution 
specifically allows.
156
 The court further reasoned that, were they to rule 
against the State, the voting requirement to enact special exemptions would 
be a simple majority, but taking those same exemptions back would require 
the article V, section 33 supermajority restriction.
157
 This would make it 
even more difficult for the legislature to raise money for the State, which 
                                                                                                                 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. ¶ 19, 401 P.3d at 1159. 
 150. Id. ¶ 18, 401 P.3d at 1158. 
 151. Id. ¶ 22, 401 P.3d at 1160-61. 
 152. Id. ¶ 22, 401 P.3d at 1161; see also OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 5); OKLA. CONST. art. 5, 
§ 50.  
 153. OKLA. CONST. art. 10, § 5(B). 
 154. Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶ 22, 401 P.3d at 1160-61. 
 155. OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 50.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶ 24, 401 P.3d at 1161-62. 
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the court decided would be at odds with the Oklahoma Constitution.
158
 
Additionally, this difficulty would be contrary to the policy that “those 
lacking . . . political clout” could not secure exemptions from tax, forcing 
the poor to shoulder a disproportionally large burden of support for the 
State.
159
  
2. The Dissenting Opinions 
In both dissenting opinions, the dissenting justices disagreed with Justice 
Wyrick’s reliance on Leveridge as dispositive of the issue. Chief Justice 
Combs’ dissent spent considerable time differentiating Leveridge from 
Oklahoma Automobile Dealers.
160
 Those joining in his dissent agreed with 
the chief justice that the law implicated in Leveridge was not the product of 
a revenue bill because the “principal object was not to raise revenue,” but 
rather “to close a loophole that allowed used car dealers to avoid certain 
taxation” by, effectively, abusing the system.161 Essentially, the chief justice 
believed that the revenue raised from closing that loophole was incidental 
to the actual purpose of preventing legal tax evasion that was the source of 
drafter error.
162
 The majority parried this argument by pointing out that 
Leveridge was not decided on that issue at all.
163
 In fact, as discussed 
above, the majority almost immediately conceded that prong of the 
Anderson test: there is no dispute that the purpose of House Bill 2433 was 
to raise revenue, and there was no dispute in Leveridge as to whether the 
bill in that case had any purpose other than to raise revenue.
164
 In both 
cases, the decision turned exclusively on whether the bill levied a tax in the 
strict sense of the word—the first prong of the test. 
Additionally, both Chief Justice Combs and Justice Watt separately 
argued that, under State Question 640, Fent v. Fallin stood to recognize not 
only that the definition of “revenue bill” had changed, but that Oklahoma 
Automobile Dealers presented the opportunity for it to change again.
165
 
Justice Watt pointed out that “the fact that the text of [an] amendment did 
                                                                                                                 
 158. Id. ¶ 24, 401 P.3d at 1162. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. ¶ 6, 401 P.3d at 1164-65 (Combs, C.J., dissenting). 
 161. Id. ¶ 6, 401 P.3d at 1165 (Combs, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 162. See id. ¶ 6, 401 P.3d at 1164-65 (Combs, C.J., dissenting). 
 163. Id. ¶ 13, 401 P.3d at 1157. 
 164. Id. ¶ 8, 401 P.3d at 1155-56; Leveridge v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1956 OK 77, ¶ 12, 
294 P.2d 809, 811 (“The bill under consideration does not within its four corners levy a tax 
and for said reason is not per se a revenue bill.”). 
 165. Okla. Auto. Dealers, ¶ 8, 401 P.3d at 1165 (Combs, C.J., dissenting); Id. ¶ 4, 401 
P.3d at 1167 (Watt, J., dissenting). 
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not specifically change the original language” of the Constitution does not 
prevent changes in the definitions of words found in the provisions “in light 
of the intent of the voters” that pass those constitutional amendments.166  
As the majority opinion pointed out,
167
 the dissent focused heavily on the 
argument that because the bill would force taxpayers to pay more money to 
the State, it is automatically a revenue bill within the meaning of the 
Oklahoma Constitution, especially in light of State Question 640 and 
Fent.
168
 The dissent further argued that, just as State Question 640 caused 
Anderson to be partially overruled, so too should it cause Leveridge to be 
overruled.
169
 The Fent court recognized that State Question 640 was not 
meant to restrict the legislature’s ability to amend tax measures that are 
already in place unless “such statutory amendments do not ‘raise’ or 
increase the tax burden.”170 Justice Watt contended that the primary 
purpose of House Bill 2433 was “to reach into the people’s pockets” to 
support the government; the bill increases the tax burden on the people and, 
therefore, is a revenue bill within the meaning of the Constitution.
171
 To 
hold as the majority did, according to the dissent, elevated “form over 
function.”172  
But, although the majority recognized that it would be easy to view the 
holding as such, there exists a clear distinction between the “elimination of 
a special exemption from an existing tax” and the levy of a brand new 
tax.
173
 As previously discussed, the court chose not to overrule Leveridge 
because of the “unmistakable constitutional policy disfavoring special 
exemptions.”174 State Question 640 did not convince the majority that it 
should ignore that policy, even if it would result in a higher taxpayer 
burden. Although the overarching consideration is whether a bill seeks to 
raise revenue, State Question 640 did not completely remove the first prong 
of the Anderson test requiring that the bill levy a tax in the strict sense of 
the word. So, relying again on that prong, the majority dismissed much of 
the dissents’ arguments because they failed to establish that House Bill 
2433 actually levied a new tax.  
                                                                                                                 
 166. Id. ¶ 8, 401 P.3d at 1169 (Watt, J., dissenting) (citing Fent v. Fallin, 2014 OK 105, 
345 P.3d 1113). 
 167. Id. ¶ 17, 401 P.3d at 1158. 
 168. Id. ¶ 12, 401 P.3d at 1170 (Watt, J., dissenting). 
 169. Id. ¶ 20, 401 P.3d at 1174 (Watt, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. (quoting Fent, ¶ 17, 345 P.3d at 1117-18). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. ¶ 15, 401 P.3d at 1170 (Watt, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. ¶ 21, 401 P.3d at 1160. 
 174. Id. ¶ 22, 401 P.3d at 1161. 
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C. Sierra Club v. State and Richardson v. State 
Two other cases brought before the Supreme Court were decided under 
much of the same analysis as Fent and Leveridge. The first case, Sierra 
Club v. State, was a challenge to House Bill 1449 and the “Motor Fuels Tax 
Fee.”175 Basing the decision primarily on the reasoning from Naifeh, the 
court ruled that House Bill 1449 was a revenue bill that was enacted 
unconstitutionally.
176
 Second, attorney and gubernatorial candidate Gary 
Richardson brought challenges to House Bill 1449, House Bill 2433, and 
House Bill 2348 in Richardson v. State.
177
 While the constitutionality of 
House Bill 1449 and House Bill 2433 was already challenged and resolved 
in the previous cases, the court had to consider House Bill 2348, which 
“uncouple[d] the standard Oklahoma income tax deduction from” that of 
the Internal Revenue Code.
178
 The court chose not to rule on that issue, 
however, because it was, at the time of the challenge, impossible to 
accurately predict how the new law would affect revenue for the State.
179
 
1. Sierra Club v. State  
The Petitioner in Sierra Club v. State
180
 was a national environmental 
organization that primarily advocated for the “mov[ement] away from . . . 
fossil fuels . . . and [moving] toward[s] a clean energy economy.”181 The 
organization brought a challenge to House Bill 1449 that created the 
“Motor Fuels Tax Fee,” which was designed to affect drivers of hybrid and 
electric cars.
182
 The purpose of the law was to recoup revenue lost from gas 
taxes by charging an annual fee of $100 for electric cars and $30 for 
hybrids in lieu of the tax the drivers would have paid on fuel.
183
 In a 6-3 
decision, the court held that House Bill 1449 was a revenue bill within the 
meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution and was enacted outside of the 
restrictions of article V, section 33.
184
 In effect, Oklahoma did not 
previously tax electric cars, so this tax was a new levy. 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Sierra Club v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 83, ¶¶ 2-3, 405 P.3d 691, 
694. 
 176. Id. ¶¶ 23, ¶ 26, 405 P.3d at 700. 
 177. Richardson v. State, 2017 OK 85, ¶ 1, 406 P.3d 571, 572. 
 178. Id. ¶ 3, 406 P.3d at 572. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Sierra Club, 2017 OK 83, 405 P.3d 691. 
 181. About, SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/about (last visited Feb. 17, 2018). 
 182. H.R. 1449, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Sierra Club, ¶ 26, 405 P.3d at 700. 
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For the most part, the court reiterated much of its decision in Naifeh in 
concluding that House Bill 1449 satisfied both prongs of the Anderson test. 
However, the court faced the government’s persuasive comparisons to the 
“mileage tax cases,” Pure Oil Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, Ex parte 
Tindall, and Ex parte Sales,
185
 because these cases raised the question of 
whether the purpose of House Bill 1449 was to raise revenue, or whether 
that revenue gained was incidental to a more regulatory purpose.
186
 
Oklahoma argued that those cases were dispositive of whether House Bill 
1449 was a revenue bill because its principal purpose was to “equaliz[e] the 
financial burden of maintaining” the state highways.187 However, the court 
differentiated the mileage tax cases by examining the purposes behind their 
respective bills. In both Ex parte Tindall and Ex parte Sales, the court ruled 
consecutively on the same provision of an act that established a fee for 
using the public highways for profit for “common carriers.”188 That fee was 
ruled to not be a revenue bill because the primary purpose of the fee was 
“to regulate the use of public highways by transportation companies,” and 
the fee gave the companies the privilege of that use.
189
 The fee in Pure Oil 
Co. was also only assessed on “commercial enterprises” that use the 
highways for profit.
190
 House Bill 1449, on the other hand, created a fee 
that would have been prescribed to potentially all Oklahomans, as long as 
they purchased a hybrid or electric vehicle.
191
  
Furthermore, the laws upheld in the “mileage tax cases” were given 
specific regulatory purposes, and the revenue raised was incidental to those 
purposes.
192
 In contrast, House Bill 1449 provided very little regulatory 
direction of the funds that would be collected by the fee it created.
193
 
                                                                                                                 
 185. Id. ¶ 13, 405 P.3d at 697; see also Pure Oil Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1936 OK 
516, 66 P.2d 1097; Ex parte Tindall, 1924 OK 669, 229 P. 125; Ex parte Sales, 1924 OK 
668, 233 P. 186. 
 186. Sierra Club, ¶ 13, 405 P.3d at 697. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Tindall, ¶ 6, 229 P. at 128; see Sales, ¶ 12, 233 P. at 187 (“The facts in the two cases 
being identical, and the same questions of law being involved in both cases, the decision in 
this case must follow the opinion in the Tindall Case.”). 
 189. Tindall, ¶¶ 0, 1, 229 P. at 126. 
 190. Pure Oil Co., ¶ 10, 66 P.2d at 1100. 
 191. Sierra Club, ¶ 16, 405 P.3d at 697. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. ¶ 16, 405 P.3d at 697-98. The text of the bill does not impose any new regulatory 
restrictions which would use the revenue collected from the law. It merely directs revenue to 
be collected from hybrid and electric vehicle owners each year. H.R. 1449, 56th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. 2-3 (Okla. 2017). 
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Although the bill created the “State Highway Construction and 
Maintenance Fund,” it only directed “the lessor of Ten Thousand 
Dollars . . . and one and one-half percent” of the revenue to any specific 
use, namely “the development and maintenance of alternative fuel 
corridors.”194 House Bill 1449 satisfied the principal purpose requirement 
of revenue bills because the revenue raised was not incidental to a 
regulatory purpose; raising revenue was the main concern for the bill. 
Following this reasoning, the court concluded that the Motor Fuels Tax 
Fee also satisfied the first prong: it levied a tax in the strict sense of the 
word.
195
 Contrasting again with the “mileage tax cases,” the court noted the 
“extensive regulations that went along with the fee[s]” in those cases, as 
opposed to the distinct lack of regulations in House Bill 1449, “except to 
forbid registration of [a] vehicle if the [fee] is not paid.”196 The court 
concluded that, because the payment by the taxpayer blends with the 
general benefit of supporting governmental functions, it is a tax.
197
 Much 
like the “Smoking Cessation Fee” contested in Naifeh was held to be a tax 
instead of a fee, the “Motor Fuels Tax Fee” is also a tax.198 The amount 
paid was not in exchange for a specific, statute-apportioned governmental 
service, instead it was for the general funding of the state with only a very 
small portion of the funds directed to a fund designed to compensate for 
damage to public roads.
199
 Because this fee’s provisions were very similar 
to those of the “Smoking Cessation Fee” challenged in Naifeh, the court 
held that it passed both prongs of the Anderson test, and it was a revenue 
bill within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution.
200
 Therefore, 
because the bill was enacted outside the strictures of article V, section 33, it 
was unconstitutional.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 194. H.R. 1449, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. 3 (Okla. 2017). 
 195. See Sierra Club, ¶ 24, 405 P.3d at 699-700. 
 196. Id. ¶ 22, 405 P.3d at 699. 
 197. Id. ¶ 24, 405 P.3d at 700. 
 198. Id. ¶ 24, 405 P.3d at 699. 
 199. Id.; H.R. 1449, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. 3 (Okla. 2017); see also Naifeh v. State ex rel. 
Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, ¶ 45, 400 P.3d 759, 773 (distinguishing a tax from a fee by 
saying a tax is subject to a “reasonable rule of apportionment” so as “to provide public 
revenue for the support of the government” (quoting Obusee Co-op Ass’n v. Okla. Wheat 
Utilization Research & Mkt. Dev. Comm’n (1964 OK 81, ¶ 8, 391 P.2d 216, 218))). 
 200. Sierra Club, ¶ 26, 405 P.3d at 700. 
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2. Richardson v. State 
Gary Richardson brought the final case in the series of 2017 revenue bill 
cases decided by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
201
 Petitioner Richardson 
challenged House Bills 2433, 1449, and 2348.
202
 The Supreme Court had 
already decided on the constitutionality of both House Bill 2433, in 
Oklahoma Automobile Dealers, and House Bill 1449, in Sierra Club.
203
 
Therefore, the court did not revisit those bills, nor did Richardson present 
any new arguments against them.
204
 
However, the court had not yet considered House Bill 2348.
205
 In an 
effort to freeze the Oklahoma standard tax deduction at the 2017 level, the 
Oklahoma legislature enacted House Bill 2348,
206
 which “uncouples the 
standard [state] deduction from the amount allowed by the Internal Revenue 
Code.”207 The issue boiled down to whether this was even a justiciable 
controversy before the court.
208
 It proved impossible to discern whether this 
enacted law would provide more or less revenue, or make any change at 
all.
209
 The court denied jurisdiction over the challenge to House Bill 2348 
because it was not possible to decide whether the enacted law was a 
revenue bill within the meaning of article V, section 33.
210
 As discussed 
above, a bill is only a revenue bill if it increases revenue or the tax burden 
on the public, as decided in Fent v. Fallin.
211
 While the previous revenue 
bill cases all had estimated tax burden changes, it was unclear at the time of 
the decision whether this bill would have any effect.
212
 Because the bill was 
“not ripe for review,” the court was unable to decide the constitutionality of 
House Bill 2348 and denied original jurisdiction.
213
 
While House Bill 2348 was implicitly upheld for the time being, a future 
challenge is certainly possible now that the effects of House Bill 2348 are 
                                                                                                                 
 201. See Richardson v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 85, ¶ 0, 406 P.3d 571, 
572. 
 202. Id. ¶ 1, 406 P.3d at 572.  
 203. See Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, 401 
P.3d 1152; Sierra Club, 2017 OK 83, 405 P.3d 691. 
 204. See Richardson, ¶¶ 2, 4, 406 P.3d at 572. 
 205. H.R. 2348, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Richardson, ¶ 3, 406 P.3d at 572. 
 208. Id. ¶ 5, 406 P.3d at 573. 
 209. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5, 406 P.3d at 572, 573. 
 210. Id. ¶ 5, 406 P.3d at 573. 
 211. See discussion supra Section III.D. 
 212. Richardson, ¶ 3, 406 P.3d at 572. 
 213. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7, 406 P.3d at 573. 
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known.
214
 With the Trump Administration’s changes to the Internal 
Revenue Code, the standard deduction has greatly increased.
215
 Had this bill 
been struck down as unconstitutional, the Oklahoma standard deduction 
would have greatly increased with the federal standard deduction. The 
majority in Richardson made it clear that the only reason a review of House 
Bill 2348 was not ripe for review was because “it [was] unclear at th[at] 
time whether H.B. 2348 w[ould] increase revenue in Oklahoma.”216 This 
language strongly suggests that, now that the effects are known, this law is 
very susceptible to a constitutional challenge. However, just as House Bill 
1449 in Sierra Club was struck down in part due to its broad application to 
taxpayers, House Bill 2348 could be struck down because changes to the 
standard deduction affect the vast majority of Oklahomans.
217
 While the 
amount of revenue expected to be raised is minimal, only $4.4 million,
218
 
House Bill 2348 would also prevent the massive decrease in revenue that 
would come with the increase in the federal standard deduction. It is 
therefore likely that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would rule that the 
principal purpose of House Bill 2348 is to raise revenue, thereby satisfying 
the second prong of the Anderson test.  
Assuming House Bill 2348 does satisfy the second prong, the court in 
Richardson would then be faced with deciding whether House Bill 2348 
levied a tax in the strict sense of the word, the first prong of the Anderson 
test. Just as the court in Oklahoma Automobile Dealers was not persuaded 
by the fact that House Bill 2433 would require taxpayers to pay more,
219
 the 
fact that the Richardson bill would prevent taxpayers from enjoying a larger 
deduction is not enough for the court to consider the bill a new tax levy. 
The Richardson bill is very similar to House Bill 2433 in the sense that both 
                                                                                                                 
 214. See supra Section IV.D. 
 215. Compare I.R.S. Pub. 501, 25 tbl.6 (Jan. 2, 2018), with Rev. Proc. 2018-18, 2018-10 
I.R.B. 396 (Mar. 5, 2018) (doubling the federal standard income tax deduction). Many 
federal exemptions have been removed to make up for the difference in the standard 
deduction. Oklahoma would have seen a proportional increase in the state standard 
deduction without the removal of any tax exemptions. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 
Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021, 131 Stat. 2054, 2072-73 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 63). 
 216. Richardson, ¶ 5, 406 P.3d at 573 (emphasis omitted). 
 217. See infra Part V.C. 
 218. Associated Press, Oklahoma House Passes Standard Deduction Revenue Measure, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 2, 2017, 12:35 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-
states/oklahoma/articles/2017-05-02/oklahoma-house-passes-standard-deduction-revenue-
measure (citing Republican Representative Louis Moore, the bill drafter). 
 219. Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 17, 
401 P.3d 152, 1158. 
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bills sought to change only a part of a previously enacted tax benefit.
220
 
Because the Richardson court ruled that a partial removal of a tax 
exemption did not levy a tax in the strict sense of the word, it seems 
unlikely that simply changing the relationship of a state deduction to the 
equivalent federal deduction would levy a tax, either. 
V. How the Oklahoma Legislature Can Raise Money 
The cases discussed above serve as the most up-to-date guidelines for the 
Oklahoma legislature when drafting new legislation to raise revenue and 
increase the tax burden. This section outlines the implications of each 2017 
Supreme Court case and provides some reasonable inferences that can be 
gleaned from those decisions.  
A. Raising Revenue for Specific Purposes 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s opinion in Naifeh outlined many 
important considerations for the Oklahoma legislature when authoring bills 
that are either regulatory in nature and contain a fee provision or are purely 
a tax increase. In light of the continuing deficit crisis after Senate Bill 845’s 
invalidation, the guidelines provided by Naifeh must be closely adhered to 
for future legislative sessions.  
The Supreme Court has made it clear that if the legislature is going to 
provide a regulatory purpose in new legislation, the revenue received from 
the bill in question must substantially go toward fulfilling that purpose.
221
 
The revenue raised from the bill must be merely incidental to the true 
purpose of the bill.
222
 The legislature can provide any purpose in the bill, 
but it is not dispositive of the issue.
223
 The purpose should not only be 
written into the bill, but should also be reflected in the enactment of the 
legislation by explaining how revenue will be collected and why it is being 
collected. Because the fee in Naifeh was not allocated directly to a 
government agency to confer a benefit to the taxpayer, it could not be said 
to have a regulatory purpose.
224
 It simply provided a way to increase the tax 
burden to cover Oklahoma’s budget deficit. Although “contextual 
evidence” can be extremely important in evaluating the revenue-raising 
potential of new legislation, it is possible that the text, on its own, can 
                                                                                                                 
 220. See generally H.R. 2348, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
 221. Naifeh v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63, ¶ 34, 400 P.3d 759, 769. 
 222. Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 400 P.3d at 768-69. 
 223. See id. ¶ 32, 400 P.3d at 768-69. 
 224. See id. ¶ 39, 400 P.3d at 771. 
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establish the “primary operation and effect” of raising revenue to support 
the state.
225
 
That said, even if legislation provides a sufficiently regulatory purpose, 
the amount of money raised for a claimed purpose in relation to the total 
expected revenue from a bill will now represent another important factor, as 
will the total expected revenue itself.
226
 According to Justice Wyrick, “a 
quarter-of-a-billion dollars per year is hardly ‘incidental’” even if the aim is 
“designed to reduce smoking.”227 While this amount is possibly dispositive 
on its own, it is compounded by the fact that only an insignificant 0.5% of 
the revenue would actually go towards preventing and reducing smoking.
228
 
It remains unclear just how far the estimated $1 million would have gone in 
achieving this result throughout the entire state of Oklahoma, but it was 
certainly not far enough to convince the Oklahoma Supreme Court that the 
generic cigarette tax was a simple regulatory “fee,” especially given how 
much excess revenue the bill provided. The court may have been satisfied 
with the “regulatory purpose” arguments had a much more substantial 
portion of the revenue gone to the claimed purpose. While the estimated 
minimum fraction of future revenue that would satisfy a regulatory purpose 
is far from certain, the legislature was nowhere close in the Smoking 
Cessation and Prevention Act. 
The government also argued that a “sin tax could never be a ‘revenue 
raising measure’ because such a tax is always imposed” to regulate the 
behavior it is taxing—but the court disagreed.229 Because the revenue 
raising “is itself the ‘regulatory device,’” the principal purpose is to raise 
revenue.
230
 For this reason, virtually all “sin taxes” constitute revenue bills 
within the meaning of the Oklahoma Constitution.
231
 The primary purpose 
of a “sin tax”232 is to “reach into the people’s pockets,” undoubtedly the 
principal purpose behind Senate Bill 845—“the single largest source of . . . 
revenue” that the legislature drafted during the 2017 Session.233  
                                                                                                                 
 225. Id. ¶ 22, 400 P.3d at 766. 
 226. See id. ¶ 36, 400 P.3d at 770. 
 227. Id. ¶ 35, 400 P.3d at 769-70. 
 228. Id. ¶ 24, 400 P.3d at 767. 
 229. Id. ¶ 35 & n.55, 400 P.3d at 770 & n.55. 
 230. Id. ¶ 35, 400 P.3d at 770. 
 231. See id. ¶ 36, 400 P.3d at 770 (describing cigarette taxes as “regulatory tool[s]” and 
“sin tax[es]”). 
 232. Sin Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “sin tax” as “[a]n 
excise tax”). 
 233. Naifeh, ¶ 37, 400 P.3d at 770. 
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Moreover, Justice Wyrick explained another legislative consideration 
when making a regulatory bill: flexibility of the provisions. The drafters of 
Senate Bill 845 attempted to create a regulatory scheme by prohibiting the 
use of tobacco on state-owned property, directing certain organizations to 
“work together” to combat specific smoking-related issues, and adding a 
“conspicuous sign[]” requirement for areas which already prohibit 
smoking.
234
 In fact, one provision directed owners of public places to 
simply “[a]sk smokers to refrain from smoking.”235 Justice Wyrick ruled 
that these kinds of provisions were simply too vague and flexible to be 
considered truly “regulatory.”236 In fact, some of these provisions, as it 
turns out, simply codified policies already in place: Section 5 of the bill 
codified Governor Fallin’s executive order prohibiting smoking on state-
owned property.
237
 None of these provisions utilized the revenue derived 
from the fee, and some would not even be controlled functions of the state. 
The provisions hewed closer to guidelines or suggestions than regulatory 
laws that require adherence. Requiring owners of certain businesses to 
place anti-smoking signs and tell smokers to leave their premises simply 
does not require $200 million from the state budget. To be truly 
“regulatory,” a bill will not only have to explicitly state how those subject 
to the provisions can comply but might also need to explain how the money 
raised will be used. If the legislature wants to transform a revenue bill into a 
regulatory bill, the regulatory measures cannot be nearly as malleable as 
those set forth in the Smoking Cessation and Prevention Act, especially if it 
is one which would generate significant state income. 
The final important consideration the legislature must make when 
following Naifeh is where it allocates the generated revenue. There must be 
“a direct nexus between the fee and the government service” that the fee 
supports.
238
 In Naifeh, the fee was intended to support a fund designed to 
reduce smoking in Oklahoma, and the written purpose in section 1 of the 
bill attempts to effectuate this. But upon scrutinizing the bill, one can see 
that it hardly allocated any revenue to that purpose or directed any agencies 
to require any specific activity to accomplish it. The fee, as paid by 
wholesalers when they purchase cigarettes for their own profit, would not 
be paid by a taxpayer that received any direct benefit of services being 
                                                                                                                 
 234. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess., at 2 (Okla. 2017). 
 235. Id. 
 236. Naifeh, ¶ 24, 400 P.3d at 767. 
 237. See Exec. Order 2012-01 (as enacted by Gov. Mary Fallin Feb. 6, 2012), 
https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/executive/829.pdf. 
 238. Naifeh, ¶ 39, 400 P.3d at 771. 
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created by Senate Bill 845.
239
 Instead, all but $1 million went directly to the 
state treasury for the “Health Care Enhancement Fund” that does not have 
any smoking-related strictures attached to it.
240
  
In one final attempt by the State to argue for a meek regulatory purpose, 
Sierra Club v. State instead reiterated much of what was decided in Naifeh. 
The State argued that the true purpose of the Motor Fuels Tax Fee was to 
recoup gas tax losses from taxpayers switching to electric and hybrid 
vehicles.
241
 Unfortunately, just as Senate Bill 845 in Naifeh did not actually 
describe in any real detail how the funds would be used for the stated 
purpose of the legislation, the text of the Motor Fuels Tax Fee did not 
provide any helpful insight into the revenue it would produce. In fact, 
House Bill 1449 was in an even worse position than Senate Bill 845 
because it contained no stated purpose in the text of the bill that would have 
supported the state’s contention.242 This exemplifies the importance of the 
stated purpose of a bill. If the claimed purpose of a bill is regulatory in 
nature, then the drafters must discuss exactly where the revenue will go. It 
is much more likely that the Oklahoma Supreme Court will not subject a 
bill to article V, section 33 if the drafters of the bill include a well-defined 
regulatory purpose and provisions effectuating that purpose.  
In both Naifeh and Sierra Club, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reiterated 
the holding in Fent: the principal concern when deciding if a bill is a 
“revenue bill” under the Oklahoma Constitution is whether the principal 
purpose is raising revenue. Until Fent, revenue “raising” was less 
important. The court in Fent, and now in Naifeh and beyond, recognized the 
intention of the people in enacting State Question 640—no new taxes 
without a vote of the people.  
B. Removing Exemptions from Previously Levied Taxes 
Oklahoma Automobile Dealers illustrates plainly that the first prong of 
the Anderson test requiring that a bill levy a tax in the strict sense of the 
word not only remains an important consideration but can be dispositive in 
deciding that a bill does not qualify as a “revenue bill” under the Oklahoma 
Constitution. Because the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not eliminate this 
factor, the court upheld Leveridge with its holding. Basically, bills that seek 
                                                                                                                 
 239. Id. (“[T]he . . . assessment is actually assessed against the seller of cigarettes, whom 
no one argues will make use of any government-provided health services.”). 
 240. S. 845, 56th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2017). 
 241. Sierra Club v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 83, ¶¶ 10, 13, 405 P.3d 
691, 695-96, 697. 
 242. Id. ¶ 11, 405 P.3d at 696. 
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to remove tax exemptions are not revenue bills within the meaning of 
article V, section 33.  
Although the principal purpose of the removal of a tax exemption is to 
raise revenue, thereby satisfying the first prong of the Anderson test, 
removing a tax exemption does not levy a new tax in the strict sense of the 
word. The court pointed out that the exemption the legislature sought to 
remove via the bill in question in Oklahoma Automobile Dealers was put in 
place eighty-two years before this decision for a tax that had already been 
levied two years before that.
243
 While the original enactment of the sales tax 
was subject to the strictures of article V, section 33, the removal of an 
exemption of that tax is not. The court made it clear that removing an 
exemption inherently means that the tax has already been levied.
244
 While 
the original tax would obviously be subject to article V, section 33, 
removing an exemption of that tax does not equate to a brand-new levy.  
This poses the question of whether the holding is limited to exemptions. 
Besides all the possibilities of partially or fully removing tax exemptions, 
there are also many tax deductions and credits that the legislature can 
increase, decrease, eliminate, or enact. If the legislature drafts a bill 
reducing or removing a tax deduction or credit, the bill would 
unquestionably have the principal object of raising revenue, satisfying the 
second prong of the Anderson test. It would be an obvious way of 
preventing the people from enjoying all or part of a process to lower their 
tax bill. Although nothing is certain until the issue comes before the 
Supreme Court, it seems likely that the reduction or removal of a tax 
deduction or credit would not satisfy the first prong of the Anderson test 
because, under Oklahoma Automobile Dealers, it would not levy a new tax 
in the strict sense of the word.
245
  
While there is no narrow tax imposed on only a specific set of taxpayers 
like the one in Oklahoma Automobile Dealers, tax deductions and credits 
act against the original tax imposed in the Oklahoma tax code.
246
 The 
function of a tax deduction is effectuated by decreasing the taxable income 
before taxes are ultimately imposed. Just as the removal of an exemption 
from an already levied tax did not constitute a newly levied tax, the removal 
of a deduction from pretax income would not likely constitute a newly 
levied tax. In a similar vein, tax credits are enjoyed only in specific 
                                                                                                                 
 243. Okla. Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 64, ¶ 15, 
401 P.3d 1152, 1170 (Watt, J., dissenting). 
 244. Id. ¶ 2, 401 P.3d at 1153. 
 245. See id. ¶ 20, 401 P.3d at 1160. 
 246. See generally 68 OKLA. STAT. § 2355 (2011). 
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circumstances for certain taxpayers by decreasing the calculated tax owed 
by a specific amount. Eliminating a tax credit is akin to the removal of an 
exemption because it would not force the taxpayer to pay any new tax. 
Instead, it would simply dispose of the ability of that taxpayer to lower the 
amount they owe because of their circumstances. 
C. Targeting Legislation at Smaller Groups of Taxpayers 
Finally, through a very important contrast to the mileage tax cases, the 
court in Sierra Club suggested that the more taxpayers a revenue-raising 
bill affects, the more likely the court will subject the bill to the requirements 
of article V, section 33. As discussed above, Ex parte Tindall, Ex parte 
Sales, and Pure Oil Co. were all examples of legislation that was upheld 
despite an increase in the tax burden for some taxpayers.
247
 The enacted 
fees in the mileage tax cases were imposed only on taxpayers that were 
considered transportation companies using the public highways for their 
own profit. The government in Sierra Club compared those fees to the 
Motor Fuels Tax Fee to show it was fully regulatory in nature. However, 
the court distinguished the Motor Fuels Tax Fee because, unlike those in 
the mileage tax cases, the fee in Sierra Club would have been imposed on 
any taxpayer that opted to purchase a hybrid or electric vehicle. This 
reasoning demonstrates that the court looks not only at the amount of 
revenue that the legislature estimates they can collect from a bill, but also at 
the width of the net the bill casts on the public. The more potential payors 
on whom the bill imposes the fee, the more likely the legislation will be 
deemed a revenue bill creating a new tax instead of a regulatory fee. 
VI. Conclusion 
To the extent the Oklahoma legislature wants to use taxes to close the 
deficit, the drafters must be able to create revenue-raising bills that raise 
revenue in a constitutionally permissible manner. Because it is so difficult 
to satisfy article V, section 33 of the Oklahoma Constitution, it is 
imperative that the legislature drafts bills to avoid it when they can.
248
 Such 
tailoring could possibly include removing some exemptions, deductions, or 
credits. Revenue-raising legislation likely cannot include any kind of fee 
                                                                                                                 
 247. See generally Pure Oil Co. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1936 OK 516, 66 P.2d 1097; Ex 
parte Tindall, 1924 OK 669, 229 P. 125; Ex parte Sales, 1924 OK 668, 233 P. 186. 
 248. See OKLA. CONST. art. 5, § 33. In an historic moment for the state, the Oklahoma 
legislature reached the supermajority requirement for the first time since the passage of State 
Question 640 when they passed House Bill 1010 on March 26, 2018. H.R. 1010, 56th Leg., 
2nd Spec. Sess. (Okla. 2018); see also State Question 640, What’s That?, supra note 79. 
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that seeks to affect a large portion of the population, unless that fee has a 
written regulatory purpose that goes beyond merely raising money for the 
state. No matter how the Oklahoma legislature chooses to raise the needed 
money, if the supermajority requirement is too stringent, and a vote of the 
people forced to pay the imposed taxes too unlikely, then the legislature 
will have to find a different way to comply with the Oklahoma 
Constitution. 
 
Paul Anthony Tortorici 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/5
